








Confucian Family-State and Women
A Proposal for Confucian Feminism
Ranjoo Seodu Herr
As the dominant cultural and philosophical system of East Asia for over two millennia, Confucianism has played an indisputably central role in subjugating women under one of the most systemic and prolonged patriarchies in human history. Yet Confucianism is not thereby destined to remain an inherently sexist and inveterately reactionary ideology irrelevant to the contemporary world. Confucian patriarchal practices may not be “based on theoretical reasons,” but rather on “prejudices or the particular conditions” of traditional Confucian societies (Chan 2008, 164).1 It is therefore worthwhile and timely for feminists affiliated with Confucian traditions to ask the following questions: Are core tenets of Confucianism compatible with promoting gender equality and protecting women’s well-being? If so, what form would Confucian feminism take? In this chapter, I shall advance and defend the position that, with a proper realignment of core Confucian values, an explicitly feminist reading of Confucianism—a conception of Confucian feminism—can be constructed to promote the feminist goals of gender equality and women’s well-being in contemporary Confucian societies.2 I shall argue, in particular, that the Confucian moral goal of embodying the virtue of ren 仁 (human-heartedness) applies to both women and men and that the Confucian family-state ought to aid women in achieving this moral goal by actively sharing in the responsibilities of protecting and promoting the well-being of Confucian families.
This chapter proceeds in the following order: fFirst, I shall examine a concrete historical example of Confucian patriarchy in the Chosōn Dynasty in order to identify sources of the long-standing Confucian subjugation of women. Having identified that women’s oppression in Chosōn was partly predicated on Confucian emphases on li 禮 (propriety) and family, I shall then investigate whether Confucianism is inherently antagonistic to feminism by examining these concepts within the comprehensive Confucian philosophical system. It shall be argued that the core precept of Confucianism—what I call the precept of ren—is applicable to both women and men and that Confucian emphases on li and family, contextualized in relation to this precept, do not necessitate the subjugation of women. Finally, I shall address a practical Confucian concern that promoting the precept of ren for both women and men may generate a situation in which the Confucian family would be weakened, as its maintenance in most cases depends on women’s wholehearted devotion to the domestic sphere. I shall argue that this problem can be resolved if the Confucian family-state begins to fulfill its primary responsibility to ensure the well-being and flourishing of Confucian families.
Confucianism and Women’s Subjugation—the Case of Chosōn
Confucianism has not served women well, as its ideas were misinterpreted and distorted in its long and tortuous history. The unfair and cruel treatment of women defined normalcy in most, if not all, East Asian states of the past that were more or less Confucian in their state ideology. A paradigm example of the relentless Confucian subjugation of women can be found in the case of the Chosōn Dynasty 朝鮮 (1392–1910) on the Korean peninsula (Deuchler 1992, ch. 6).3 Chosōn was a state founded on explicitly Confucian values, interpreted especially through the lenses of Zhuxi/Chu Hsi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) neo-Confucianism. Consequently, the sexist mistreatment of Chosōn women was rationalized by the Confucian framework. In order to identify whether Confucianism is necessarily sexist, a first step is to delineate the historical Confucian rationalization of women’s subjugation and determine how much is based on Confucianism proper, as was envisioned by Confucius and Mencius, the two founders of the thatthe  Confucian philosophical and valuational tradition (Herr 2003, 482). This section is devoted to this task.
According to Confucius and Mencius, the Confucian family, the essence of which is the father-son relation, is the fundamental well-spring of love and affection and the very basis of ren, the most important Confucian virtue (Mencius4 4A.27, cf. 1A.1, 6B.3, 7A.15; Analects5 1.2, 2.5). The Confucian founders of Chosōn, therefore, took seriously the family relations of not only father and son but also husband and wife as constitutive of the Confucian family,6 and attempted to structure the state of Chosōn as a distinctly Confucian society by organizing family relations according to their proper norms, or li 禮. Li refers to intersubjective “norms and standards of proper behavior” (Tu 1979, 6) pertaining to each role in human relations that accord with public expectations. According to Mencius, “between father and son, there should be affection (qin 親),” and “between husband and wife, there should be distinction (pie 別)” (Mencius 3A.4). Li pertaining to each relation, as stated by Mencius, is somewhat abstract. Therefore, Zhuxi, the preeminent nNeo-Confucian of the Song Dynasty 宋 (960–1279), wrote various handbooks with concrete and specific guidelines to elaborate on the li of family relations.7
Chosōn Confucians, faced with the urgent task of organizing a new society according to Confucian values and principles, wholeheartedly adopted not only Zhuxi’s interpretations of the Confucian classical texts, but also his handbooks of li as the defining guide for state -building (Deuchler 1992, 112). The most significant element in Zhuxi’s handbooks of li regulating family relations is the “agnatic principle (jong-beop/zongfa 宗法),” which takes patrilineal descent groups as basic units of society. Strict adherence to the agnatic principle would result in “a kinship system that rested on highly structured patrilineal descent groups. These patrilineages comprised groups of agnates who derived their common descent from a real or putative apical ancestor (si-jo 始祖) and identified themselves with a common surname (seong 姓) and a common ancestral seat (bon-gwan 本館)” (6). Neo-Confucian theorists, including Zhuxi, took the establishment of the agnatic principle as crucial to guaranteeing “the uninterrupted continuation of the political process” (129), which depended on the continuation of descent groups. Without a clear principle defining the line of descent, they worried that a descent group might disintegrate “at the death of the lineal heir” (130). Elaborate rituals of ancestor worship, mourning, and funerals became vehicles through which the patrilineal social structure was implemented, as performing such rituals necessitated the specification and clarification of the descent line.
The obsession with clarifying the descent line that “would provide the criteria on the basis of which descent group membership and thus social status could be verified,” however, clashed with the legally sanctioned custom of “polygyny,”8 which allowed men, especially of the upper class, to have multiple wives.9 This generated a sticky problem: how to prioritize the line of descent among multiple sons from multiple wives. Their solution was to “single out one wife and her children as a man’s rightful spouse and legitimate heirs” (Deuchler 1992, 232). With this aim, it was legally decided in 1413 that a man must have only one legal wife, who is the primary wife (cheo 妻), and all other wives were relegated to the status of secondary or minor wives (cheop 妾). In this, Chosōn Confucians followed the “rule of primogeniture operative in China’s feudal past,” according to which “only the eldest son by the primary wife could succeed his father” (132).
Due to the strict distinction between primary and secondary wives, “lLLineages (and families) clearly distinguished between main lines formed by the firstborn sons of primary wives, branch lines formed by sons born after the first son by the same mother, and secondary sons, who, as offspring of secondary wives, were of secondary status and therefore not full-fledged lineal members” (Deuchler 1992, 7). The distinction between primary and secondary wives functioned to divide the society into “the superior and inferior” and ensured that the power would be confined to a small number of the privileged (232). For the ruling class of Chosōn, “limiting access to the ranks of the elite” (119) by excluding sons born to secondary wives maintained the political privilege of the elite by restricting political participation of the “inferior.” “Descent and political participation therefore came to be inextricably intertwined” (119–120) through the agnatic principle bolstered by the distinction between primary and secondary wives. The agnatic principle, then, served an ideological and political purpose.
The agnatic principle is not only ideological but also inveterately patriarchal, and obsessive adherence to it created an inordinately sexist society. In a social system that was structured to maintain patrilineal descent groups according to the agnatic principle, the li of the husband-wife relation (pie 別) was taken as a strict physical segregation of the sexes predicated on the inexorable subordination of women to men. A woman’s only role was to “bring forth male offspring” in an arranged marriage (Deuchler 1992, 237, 240), so that the husband’s surname and blood line would perpetuate into the indefinite future. Women had no identity other than this primary role.10 From childhood, they were indoctrinated to fulfill this role with complete submission and physically confined to the “inner” sphere to focus solely on their domestic function (257–63).11 Women who were unable or unwilling to fulfill this role with submissiveness were often severely penalized, both socially and legally, and shunted aside as non-entities. For example, women who were rejected by their husband’s family were often refused refuge by their own families. Such women had no option but to return to the husband’s family and suffer gross injustice and ignominy for the rest of their lives by the husband and the in-laws (272–76). The legal distinction between primary and secondary wives in a social milieu that sanctioned polygyny pitted even women who were fulfilling their function of giving birth to sons against one another as competitors. Regarding secondary wives, in particular, not only did their well-being and survival depend on the husband’s whimsical favors, but their sons were destined to become secondary citizens (269–72).
I shall argue later that such an extreme form of patriarchy is incompatible with the true spirit of Confucianism proper. For the time being, let us examine what made such deviation possible. The first step in this deviation was the misinterpretation of what constitutes the Confucian family and its well-being. For neo-Confucians, the Confucian family was the patrilineal descent group and maintaining the well-being of family meant maintaining a clear line of descent in such a group. What made this misinterpretation possible? Aside from the general patriarchal tendencies of traditional societies, a contingent incident in the theorization of Confucianism played a crucial role in turning Confucianism into a patriarchal ideology. This incident was the fateful connection between sex difference and the ying-yang 陰陽 principle made by the Han Confucian Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179–104 bce), who was influenced by the Book of Changes (S. Chan 2008, 147). Subsequently, pie was interpreted as implying not just “a separation of functions” but also a metaphysical difference between the sexes that renders women’s status inferior to men’s in accordance with the cosmological order in which “heaven (yang) dominates earth (yin).” Hence, this rationalized women’s confinement to the “inner” (nei 內) or domestic sphere, strictly segregated from and completely subordinated to the “outer” (wai 外) public sphere of men. As ontologically inferior inhabitants of the subordinate sphere, women’s sole virtue was “submissiveness” (shun 順;) (Deuchler 1992, 231; see also, Mencius 3B.2; S. Chan 2008, 156), and their primary obligation was “obey[ing] [their] superiors” who are male: “When unmarried, she had to follow her father’s orders; when married, those of her husband; when widowed, those of her son” (Deuchler 1992, 231).
Zhuxi advanced the inherently patriarchal agnatic principle as the ground rule of an ideal Confucian society, predicated on the exaggerated inferiority attributed to women by Dong’s alleged metaphysical differences between the sexes. Unfortunately, this proposal was almost universally accepted by Confucian scholars of the time. The agnatic principle rationalized inordinately sexist interpretations of the Confucian family and the li of the husband-wife relation. The founders and their descendent ruling class of Chosōn wholeheartedly accepted this distorted valuational framework and thereby entrenched a severe form of patriarchy in Chosōn. In a societal system that was inexorably patriarchal, Chosōn women, especially of the upper class, unwittingly and often unwillingly became the gatekeepers of an unequal and oppressive system and paid the highest price for it. As virtual captives in the inner sphere indoctrinated with the patriarchal ideology from early years, they had no control over their lives whether before, during, or after marriage. Those who challenged the system were severely penalized by the state, their husbands’ families, and even their own families, and the only recourse for them was often death.
The Confucian Person
Women’s subjugation in the Chosōn Dynasty and other historical Confucian states was extreme. This was due in large part to widely accepted but distorted interpretations of the Confucian family and the li of the husband-wife relation, which were predicated on later Confucian theories of Dong and Zhuxi. Consequently, women’s inordinate subordination in Confucian history, as condemnable as it was, need not be taken as the concomitant of Confucianism as originally envisioned by Confucius and Mencius. Some may point out, however, that the Confucian emphases on family and li, elements constitutive of the Confucian canon, also played a crucial role in women’s subjugation. This line of reasoning suggests that women’s subjection, although not as extreme as in historical manifestations, is logically entailed by Confucianism after all. My response to this objection is that the Confucian emphases on family and li do not necessarily entail women’s subjugation when properly understood within the comprehensive philosophical framework of Confucianism. In order to identify this framework, let me elaborate on the Confucian conception of the self at its core.
The Confucian person is a “reflective, and ceaselessly transformative being” conscious of his or his/her agency (Tu 1989, 45; cf. Analects 12.1).12 The reflection—thinking (si 思)—required of this Confucian self (Mencius 6A.6, 6A.15), however, is not merely abstract and theoretical (Tu 1979, 67). Rather, it is always connected with the practical and based on the “moral mind” (xin 心), which provides not only the “antecedent commitment” to, but also the “actual activity” toward, moral excellence (Tu 1979, 67; cf. Mencius 4A.12, 6A.15). The moral mind, according to Mencius, initially consists of four kinds of feelings that provide the “beginnings” of Confucian virtues: feelings of commiseration (ceyin 惻隱), shame and dislike (xiuwu 羞惡), modesty and yielding (cirang 辭讓), and the sense of right and wrong (shifei 是非). If preserved, these feelings would transform into the four “constant” Confucian virtues of ren 仁 (human-heartedness), yi 義 (righteousness), li 禮 (propriety), and zhi 智 (wisdom), respectively (Mencius 2A.6). The moral mind is “irreducible” (Tu 1979, 65) and common to all humanity, sages and ordinary humans alike (cf. Mencius 3A.1, 6A.7, 6A.10; Analects 17.2). Indeed, the possession of the moral mind is “the defining characteristic of being human” (Tu 1979, 59; cf. Mencius 4B.19, 6A.15).
Yet the irreducibility of the moral mind does not guarantee a “spontaneous self-realization” of the Confucian moral self for everyone (Tu 1979, 65). Although all humans have the moral mind, it is often “lost” due to inhospitable external circumstances (see 63; cf. Mencius 6A.7, 6A.8, 6A.15). Still, it is “recoverable” (64) through the “establishment of the will” (62) to preserve or retrieve these four beginnings. If the original moral mind is preserved or recovered and these emotional germinations are fully actualized, the Confucian person comes closer to the Confucian moral ideal of embodying the four Confucian virtues. The underlying axiom of Confucianism, therefore, is that “all human beings are endowed with the authentic possibility to develop themselves as moral persons through the cognitive and affective functions of the mind” (Tu 1989, 46,; emphasis added). Women would be included among those capable of “human perfectibility” (Tu 1979, 63), as “there is no clear textual evidence [in the Analects and the Mencius] that women are thought to be inferior [to men] in their innate intellectual or rational capacities” (S. Chan 2008, 162).
In achieving the Confucian moral ideal, the most significant Confucian virtue is ren and the most important Confucian principle is that we ought to embody ren—the precept of ren. What, then, is ren? Although it is notoriously multifarious and elusive,13 most Confucians agree that ren is not merely a “particular virtue” of human relations, but a “general virtue” in its “inclusiveness” of other Confucian virtues (W. Chan 1955, 298; see also Tu 1979, 9; Fung 1948, 72; Analects 13.27). Some Confucians even attribute to it a special status as “a principle of inwardness,” which is “the self-reviving, self-perfecting, and self-fulfilling process of an individual” toward moral perfection (Tu 1979, 9). Construed thus, the process of actualizing ren is “practically identical” to the process of “self-cultivation” (xiushen 修身;) (6; cf. Analects 14.25). Self-cultivation is a very strenuous life-long process of “self-education” to reach the highest stage of moral perfection, often involving pain and suffering, which stops “only with death” (Analects 8.7). The burden, however, is not imposed from without, but is in fact “an internally motivated sense of duty” (Tu 1989, 48), as “the uniqueness of being human is as much a responsibility as a privilege” (45). Self-cultivation is not simply a process to reach an end. Rather, the becoming process is also an “ultimate end in itself” (Tu 1979, 8). Given the arduousness of self-cultivation as a perpetual incremental progress toward moral perfection, however, only a small number of persons persists in self-cultivation to achieve the “authentic self” (9). These persons achieve the status of junzi 君子 (noble person;) (cf. Mencius 6A.15, 4B.19).
Confucian Li and Family
Ren, however, is inherently linked to human relations. Ren’s sociality is due to its inextricable relation to another Confucian virtue, li, which is “an externalization of jen [ren] in a concrete social situation” (Tu 1979, 18). Li provides ren with concrete content. The relation between ren and li is suggested in the following pivotal phrase in the Analects: rRen is “to subdue oneself (keji 克己) and [to] return to li (fuli 復禮)” (Analects 12.1). Not surprisingly, the first conjunct implies self-cultivation. Deciphering the phrase “return to li (fuli),” then, is crucial for understanding not only the sociality of ren but also the significance of li itself. As mentioned, li refers to intersubjective “norms and standards of proper behavior” that accord with public expectations pertaining to each role in core human relations. Fuli, however, does not imply “uncritical conventionalism” of conforming to accepted conventions of one’s society (Tu 1979, 12). When Confucius spoke of li, he was referring to the idealized li of Zhou 周, which he believed was more in line with ren and not the existing conventions of his own time, the chaotic SsSpring and aAAutumn period. Further, even though he looked up to the li of Zhou, Confucius did not follow it when it seemed “improper” to him. Instead, he showed the independence of mind by urging people to follow contemporary customs closer to the spirit of ren in such cases (Analects 9.3; cf. Mencius 4B.6). Li, then, represents “enlightened” norms of comportment in the spirit of ren (Cua 1996, 162). Consequently, fuli implies adhering to standards of proper behavior in human relations that conform to ren, as understood by one’s self-cultivated and enlightened moral mind (cf. Analects 3.3, 15.17; Fung 1948, 66, 70).
What, then, does ren imply in concrete human relations? Confucians typically explicate ren as “love” (ai 愛) for others (W. Chan 1955, 299; Analects 12.22), predicated on the feeling of sympathy. Ren as love, however, does not refer to the raw emotion of affection, although affection, especially toward one’s family members, does provide its basis. The proper manifestation of ren as love is rather, “To be able from one’s own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others” (Analects 6.28) and to “put oneself into the position of others” (Fung 1948, 71). This is none other than the “Golden Rule,” encompassing both of its positive and negative requirements. The positive requirement is expressed in the concept of zhong 忠 (conscientiousness),14 which is to “establish” and “enlarge” others as well as oneself (Analects 6.28; Zhongyong中庸13; see also, Fung 1948, 71).15 The negative requirement is implied in the concept of shu 恕 (reciprocity),16 which prohibits imposing on others what one does not want to be imposed on oneself (Analects 1.4, 4.15, 5.11, 12.12, 15.23; Daxue 大學 10).17 The “one thread that runs through [Confucius’] doctrines” is, therefore, none other than “zhong and shu 忠恕” (Analects 4.15). I shall refer to the principle of shu, in particular, as the principle of reciprocity that proscribes imposing on others what one does not want to be imposed on oneself. With the clarification of ren as implying the principle of reciprocity in concrete human relations, a clearer meaning now emerges of li and fuli: li represents “enlightened” norms of comportment in the five human relations that accord with the principle of reciprocity and fuli implies restoring the proper standards and norms of each relational role according to the principle of reciprocity.
Having clarified the meaning of ren and li, let us return to the concept of Confucian family to determine its proper meaning consistent with the overall Confucian philosophical framework. Recall that among the five core human relations, Confucians, including Confucius and Mencius, have traditionally considered the relation between “father and son” as the most central and essential to the Confucian family. Consonant with our goal, which is to retrieve the true meaning of Confucianism by dissociating it from its patriarchal presumptions, this central Confucian human relation ought to be understood more generally as that between parent and child, which better matches its symbolic status as “the root of ren” (Analects 1.2). The Confucian emphasis on the parent-child relation as the most significant human relation is well placed, as the parent-child relation is, both symbolically as well as practically, “the natural home for nourishing the self and, specifically, for helping the self to establish fruitful dyadic relationships” (Tu 1986, 183). In other words, the family’s central importance for Confucianism is predicated on its function as the well-spring of and practicing ground for the virtue of ren for every member of the household, especially children. The Confucian family’s raison d’être is to enable its members to become proficient practitioners of ren, for whom following the precept of ren is second nature.
Once the normative function of the Confucian family has been identified, we can examine its proper form. The typical form of the Confucian family, at the center of which is the parent-child relation, has always been a patrilineal extended family. Yet, if the core function of the family is enabling members to learn and practice ren, there is no conceptual necessity that an extended Confucian family must be of patrilineage, as was mandated by the agnatic principle. Indeed, as the primary arena in which children learn and practice ren, the Confucian family need not even be an extended family. Indeed, it may even be argued that same sex unions with children may qualify as Confucian families insofar as they enable members to become proficient practitioners of ren. Given the prevalence of extended families in Confucian East Asia and the communitarian values they serve to preservemaintain, however, I shall take in this chapterarticle consanguineous extended families, both patrilineal and matrilineal, based on the natural feeling of love and affection, as representative of the Confucian family.
As the most essential Confucian human relation, the obligation to maintain the parent-child relation according to its proper li—”“affection” (Analects 17.21; Mencius 7B.24)—is very strict in Confucianism. Traditionally, the obligation rested more heavily on the shoulders of adult children who are required to show absolute devotion and “never disobey” their parents (Analects 2.5, see also 1.7, 13.18; Mencius 4A.28, 4B.30). Although Tu argues that the principle of reciprocity applies even to this relation (1986, 181)—children may “remonstrate” (jian 諫), albeit “gently” (yinwei 隱微), when parents act against li (Xiao Jjing 孝經13).18 —Confucians in general believe that children must never overstep what is prescribed by their filial duty even when parents do not mend their ways (cf. Analects 4.18). This disproportionate burden on children to fulfill their duty to adhere to the li of the parent-child relation is understandable in the context of the Confucian tradition that evolved in small farming villages in which adult children had to stay at their parents’ farm for survival. However, in contemporary Confucian societies, more emphasis should be placed on the parental correlative duty to maintain the parent-child relation in line with the principle of reciprocity. Coercive social pressure on grown children to obey and stay with unreasonable parents may have worked in small farming villages of yesteryear. In highly mobile and nation-wide contemporary Confucian societies, however, only reciprocal efforts to strengthen mutual affection by parents and children alike can maintain the family as the “root of ren” and sustain lasting family ties.
The affection that both parents and children ought to and often do express toward each other can be deeper and stronger than in any other human relation. In Confucianism, strong emotional bonds between family members justify our preferential treatment of them, and it is toward them that ren as love should be most strongly exhibited. The depth and strength of love in the parent-child relation is aptly reflected in the translation of Mencian ren as “love with distinction” (chadengai 差等愛;, W. Chan 1955). In the Confucian tradition, love for our parents transcends even death and justifies the Confucian tradition of mourning rites and ancestor worship. As Whalen Lai writes, “Upon the love of kin that even death could not destroy, Confucians would order their society and claim that xiao 孝 (filial piety) is the ‘one root’ or the great principle of Heaven and Earth itself” (Lai 1991, 58).
The notion of “love with distinction,” however, does not imply egoism centered on one’s family. Despite the Confucian emphasis on the parent-child relation (Analects 1.2; Mencius 4A.27, 6B.3, 7A.15), the Confucian person must embrace all in his or her love (Mencius 7A.46; W. Chan 1955, 303). Love with distinction, involving “an order, a gradation, or distinction, starting with filial piety,” is concerned primarily with “the application of love,” which “necessarily varies according to one’s relationship” (301). The family is the fundamental well-spring of love and therefore provides an opportunity to practice love. Therefore, “the great exercise of [love] is in showing affection for relatives” (Zhongyong 20). However, we must apply the lessons learned within the family to non-familial relations, albeit in a diluted fashion. Therefore, Mencius urged, “Treat with respect the elders in my family, and then, by extension, also the elders in other families. Treat with tenderness the young in my own family, and then, by extension, also the young in other families” (Mencius 1A.7). Indeed, as implied in Mencius’s statement that “aAAll the myriad things are there in me” (7A.4), the true Confucian self is “an open system” (Tu 1986, 183) at the center of “a series of concentric circles . . . the outer rim of [which] never closes.”19 The precept of ren, then, requires “the broadening and deepening ‘embodiment’ of an ever-expanding web of human relationships” (188).
Family, Li, and Women
How would women relate to the Confucian emphases on family and li, reinterpreted more in line with the Confucian philosophical framework? Traditionally, the significance of the husband-wife relation is inextricably connected to the importance of the parent-child relation in Confucianism. In order for the relation between parent and child to be possible, there must first be a heterosexual couple—husband and wife—to form a union in which children would be born. Indeed, getting married and having an heir has been considered the most important filial duty in Confucianism (Mencius 4A.26).20 As mentioned previously, the proper li in the husband-wife relation for married heterosexual couples is distinction (pie 別). In the Mencian context, distinction refers to the separation of spheres between inner and outer (nei-wai 內外) “based on functions” (S. Chan 2008, 150). Accordingly, adherence to pie implies that men who occupy the public world ought to focus on affairs pertaining to the outside world and women who occupy the private domestic world ought to focus on affairs pertaining to the household. On the surface, pie as functional distinction or the division of labor between husband and wife may seem justifiable for the sake of running family affairs efficiently and thereby maximizing household welfare. Especially in an age when women’s public activity was restricted, it is conceivable how women’s labor would come to be confined to the domestic sphere.
However, this functional justification of pie is unjustifiable according to the Confucian precept of ren as reciprocity. Even if one grants that some division of labor may be necessary in the husband-wife relation, the Mencian conception of pie, understood as functional distinction that neatly coincides with the sexual divide, contradicts the principle of reciprocity that proscribes imposing on others what one does not want to be imposed on oneself. A husband, especially if he enjoys public participation and dislikes domestic activities himself, ought not to coerce ahisthe wife into domestic confinement, but engage in a mutually respectful conversation in order to determine her true preferences and a just division of household labor in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. Given the diversity of human disposition, it is implausible to insist that the household division of labor ought to be predetermined unilaterally for all couples. The principle of reciprocity has to be applied on a case-by-case basis. If a man who enjoys domestic affairs more than public affairs and a woman who has the opposite disposition marry, they may decide to divide their labor according to their preferences. This would still be a division of labor based on functional distinction, but the content of the division would be reversed from what is prescribed by the Mencian pie.
The confinement of women in the domestic sphere by emphasizing functional distinction is also fundamentally at odds with the precept of ren as entailing “a continuous process of extension” of li (Tu 1979, 24). As we have seen, the true Confucian self is “an open system” and the completion of his or his or her self-cultivation, while starting with the family, must include “the universe as a whole” (29). The precept of ren, in other words, requires that Confucian persons, whether women or men, extend their love to others in an ever- wider circle of human relations in the process of self-cultivation by adhering to the principle of reciprocity, while taking family as the center of “concentric circles.” Refusing to extend oneself outward “restricts us to a closed circle” (Tu 1986, 188), thereby stunting our moral growth. Confining women in the domestic sphere, then, constitutes an unwarranted restriction of women’s moral growth.
Arguing for women’s expansion of the “web of human relationships” does not imply that women should abandon their role as mother and/or housewife entirely and become nominal men. Indeed, “taking care of family affairs is itself active participation in politics” (Tu 1986, 189; cf. Analects 2.21), as the family itself is intimately connected to the public realm as “the training ground for moral cultivation” (S. Chan 2008, 150). Yet the role of mothers in educating the next generation to become active participants inof the public sphere depends on their understanding the crucial connection between the domestic sphere and the public sphere, which is in turn predicated on their being active participants in the public sphere themselves.21 In this regard, mothers in traditional Confucian societies were unable to perform this crucial role adequately as a result of their domestic confinement. Therefore, women must engage in the public sphere to differentin varying degrees, just as men must engage in the domestic sphere to differentin varying degrees. Variations may exist in the extent to which each person engages in either sphere, depending on their disposition and preferences.
This variation, however, should not pose a problem for Confucianism correctly interpreted, since both spheres enable Confucian persons to practice self-cultivation by adhering to the precept of ren, provided that persons maintain a reasonable balance between the two spheres. A woman’s decision to cultivate herself by concentrating more on the public sphere would be perfectly acceptable in Confucianism, as would a man’s decision to cultivate himself by focusing more on the domestic sphere. Indeed, if a woman decides that she prefers to cultivate herself mainly in the public sphere by opting not to marry, she would still be a respectable Confucian moral person, provided that she fulfills her filial and familial duties to her parents and relatives. In sum, the Confucian emphases on the family and li are compatible with the feminist goals of gender equality—understood as women enjoying equal opportunity for moral self-cultivation as men—and women’s well-being—understood as women being able to fully actualize their potential to be Confucian junzis.
The Confucian Family-State and Feminism
My foregoing argument may be difficult to swallow for many mainstream Confucians. If women are allowed to cultivate themselves by primarily focusing on the public realm to the same extent as men, then who stays home and takes care of the children? As anyone who is or has been a parent knows, children need constant attention and guidance from caring adults. In the absence of outside assistance—which is often the case in contemporary East Asia, as most grown children move out of their farming villages and into cities in search of better-paying jobs—at least one parent, whether male or female, must stay home and become the primary parent, especially when children are young.22 In reality, the primary parent is often the mother, and this has been taken for granted in Confucian societies. In fact, a mother who is not the primary parent is often criticized for reneging on her most important responsibility.
Yet, as we have seen, the Confucian precept of ren does not necessitate that the female parent to assume the role of primary parent. Women and men are equal in their possession of the moral capacity and ought to cultivate themselves into to embodying the virtue of ren and extend the circle of li outward. In contemporary Confucian societies, in which more and more families are nuclear, however, the core Confucian precept of ren may seem to be in practical conflict with the Confucian emphasis on the family, the well-being of which depends on one parent, often the mother, taking primary responsibility for child care. This practical conflict poses a crucial problem for constructing a feminist conception of Confucianism fit for the contemporary Confucian world.
I believe, however, that a solution to this problem may be found in the idea of the Confucian “family-state” (guojia 國家). “Family-state” is a term regularly used for ‘“state”’ in Confucian East Asia. This suggestion may seem counter-intuitive to many Confucians. After all, historical Confucian family-states promoted and maintained extreme forms of patriarchy, as was the case in Chosōn. Yet, like any other term, this concept can be interpreted in different ways. As indicated earlier, my aim is not to settle with established interpretations but rather to update the parameters of Confucianism by exploring its conceptual and logical implications. The conclusion that I intend to justify is that Confucianism, rightly interpreted, can promote a feminist Confucian family-state.
In order to achieve this aim, we need to restore the true meaning of the Confucian state, which is expressed in Mencius’s classical statement that “the people (min 民) are the most important [element in a state]” (Mencius 7B.14; see also, Fung 1948, 111).23 A fourteenth- century Korean Confucian, Jeong Do-Jeon (三峰 鄭道傳 1342–1398),24 accepted and developed this idea further and argued that the people are the foundation (bon 本) of the state (D. Jeong 2006, 63, 236, /book 10X, book 13XIII). Indeed, the people are “the Heaven of the ruler” (236, book 13XIII,), as the Heaven’s Will, “unfathomable” in itself, expresses itself through “the will of the people which can be known” (Fung 1948, 117; Mencius 5A.5). Therefore, “the ruler must love the people wholeheartedly” (D. Jeong 2006, 236, / book XIII13), and all state policies must aim at promoting the well-being of the people. We may call this the principle of “people-centeredness” (min-bon/minben 民本;) (Han 1999, 139) and take it as the most central political principle of Confucianism.
The principle of people-centeredness is in fact an application of the Confucian precept of ren, as politics and morality are one and the same in ideal Confucian politics. The precept of ren to cultivate the self and embody ren, as we have seen, requires “an ever-extending web of human relationships” (Tu 1986, 188). Practicing politics according to the principle of people-centeredness and loving the people, then, constitutes the consummation of the precept of ren. Therefore, when the ruler follows the principle of people-centeredness, which is a manifestation of ren, he (or she) practices the politics of ren (renzheng 仁政, cf. Mencius 2A.3), the aim of which is not only cultivating the self (xiuji 修己/zhengji 正己), but also rectifying others (zhengren 正人 or zhiren 治人;) (Analects 12.7, 13.6, 13.13, 14.44, 15.17, 19.3; Mencius 2A.4, 5A.5). Rectifying others implies enabling them to cultivate themselves and strive toward moral excellence. The creation of the ideal Confucian polity in which every member is rectified is indeed the Confucian common good, advocated by all self-cultivating members. Rulers who conscientiously strive toward such a goal are not egocentric or power-hungry politicians but junzis, who are superior practitioners of morality and moral educators of the people (Jeong 2006, bookBk 11XI, 81; cf. Analects 12.19; Mencius 5A.5, 5A.6; Fung 1948, 115–17). When rulers practice renzheng, they earn the trust of the people who take them as their symbolic parents who truly care about their moral and economic well-being. The ideal Confucian politics, then, is a kind of trustee politics (shintak-jeongchi/xintuozhengzhi 信託政治;) (Han 1999, 152) in which the people will trust and follow rulers as their caring parents (Analects 17.6; cf. Mencius 1B.7).25 This, I believe, is the true meaning of the Confucian “family-state.”
Some claim that the notion of the Confucian family-state necessarily implies a paternalistic state in which “subjects have no right whatsoever to participate in politics.” It may act as a benevolent dictator and consider that “the people’s consent is automatic” as long as their wants are satisfied (J. Chan 2006). I disagree. Even if one accepts the hackneyed analogy of the state as “family writ large” literally, a family consists of multiple members who diverge in age and moral maturity. In the traditional extended Confucian family, in particular, grandparents as well as grown but unmarried siblings are included. Therefore, the notion of a nuclear family consisting of a pair of adult parents raising pre-adolescent children, in which parents may sometimes justifiably impose their conception of the family’s well-being on children, whose “consent is automatic” as long as their wants are satisfied, is too impoverished to do justice to the negotiations needed to maintain affection among diverse family members. Maintaining affection among diverse family members and thereby enhancing the well-being of the family may require respecting one another as equally valuable members of the family and incorporating their feedback in creating a harmonious family relations.
If we move beyond this analogy and focus on the ruler-subject, or people-politician, relation, the significance of equal respect for the members of polity cannot be overemphasized in Confucianism. Even in the days of Mencius and Jeong when the majority of the people were illiterate and ignorant peasants, rulers’ respect for the people loomed large in Confucianism, as statements such as “the people are the foundation of the state and the Heaven of the ruler” make clear. The people’s will as expressive of Heaven’s Will could even justify the removal of a hereditary ruler who rules arbitrarily and oppresses the people (D. Jeong 2006, 214/, book XIII13; Mencius 1B.8, 2B.2, 4A.1, 4B.3, 5B.9). Therefore, “whether the people voluntarily consent to the ruler’s entitlement to rule is the criterion of his legitimacy” (Han 1999, 143).
Fast forward to the contemporary world. The people of East Asia are some of the most well-educated and well-informed citizens in the world today, providing the pool from which current and future political leaders are selected. It goes without saying, then, that adult members of such polities deserve utmost respect by their politicians and are entitled to full political participation. Such respect deserved by adult members can only be properly materialized in a democracy, and, despite the prevalent view that ideas of equality and democracy are incompatible with Confucianism,26 a unique form of Confucian democracy is compatible with the Confucian philosophical system (Herr 2008,; see also Herr 2009).
One of the most pressing concerns for Confucian persons, who regard family as “the root of ren” and consider the parent-child relation as the most significant human relation, would be to maintain the well-being of the family, so that the children would grow to be good Confucian persons. Good Confucian persons, however, are not only filial children but also contributing members of the ideal Confucian polity. A democratic Confucian family-state ought to take this concern seriously. Family is indeed the primary arena in which children acquire and practice ren, which is necessary for becoming good Confucian persons who in turn constitute the ideal Confucian polity. As we have seen, the creation of the ideal Confucian polity is the Confucian common good, which ought to be the ultimate goal of a democratic Confucian family-state. The democratic Confucian family-state, therefore, must be actively involved in ensuring the well-being of Confucian families and thereby help them raise good Confucian citizens by according priority to policies that support and aid households that raise young and/or adolescent children with institutional and/or financial assistance. Such policies also promote the feminist goal of gender equality by enabling and aiding women to cultivate themselves and embody ren by engaging in the public sphere and enlarging the circle of human relations. Raising children to be good Confucian citizens and enabling women to cultivate themselves and embody ren both contribute to the Confucian common good of creating a world in which every member is rectified. The Confucian common good, therefore, requires the democratic Confucian family-state to become a major agent of feminism.
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